computer-mediated negotiations held between multiple negotiators because they increase the likelihood of inclusion in a final agreement. However, it is unclear how negotiators foster the interpersonal connection needed to secure inclusion in an agreement, especially when they are immersed in a challenging, online multiparty negotiation. In this article, we propose that one efficient way to build a positive connection is through a careful selection of language.
Over the past decade, research has demonstrated how negotiators' language and rhetorical strategies can shape success or failure in bilateral negotiations (Donohue, 2003; Rogan & Hammer, 1995; Taylor & Donald, 2003) . Little is known, however, about how language affects agreement in the context of an online multiparty negotiation. In addition, much of the existing research on the role of language in negotiations relies on hand-coded content analysis (Nuendorf, 2001 ). This approach is not only labor intensive but also introduces elements of subjectivity that may limit the generalizability of research findings. However, recent advances in computational linguistics provide new possibilities for studying social interaction through language in a more rigorous fashion, such as automatic detection of syntactic and semantic nuances (Jurafsky & Martin, 2000) and psychological and social phenomena related to emotional and cognitive states (Hart, 2000; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2006) . Although these new techniques have been developed to examine linguistic differences, they have not been applied to examine negotiators' strategies for establishing interpersonal capital in an online multiparty negotiation.
This article aims to address these gaps in the literature by examining how language affects coalition formation in online multiparty negotiations using a novel set of computational linguistic techniques. The central question to this research is the following: To what extent does language that reflects a sense of unity increase the likelihood of agreement between coalition partners? We examine this question by exploring the content of negotiators' conversations in the context of an online multiparty negotiation. This is an important inquiry because there is an increased focus on language and word choice when parties negotiate without face-to-face contact.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section we review coalition formation theory and the role that language plays in reaching agreement between potential coalition partners. We then present the data from an online multiparty negotiation experiment that investigates how language influences final coalition agreements. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the study, including which linguistic strategies negotiators should seek out or avoid.
The Language of Coalition Formation
Communication processes in multiparty negotiations are more complex than in dyadic negotiation settings because consensus among all negotiators is not required to finalize an agreement (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000) . Instead, subgroups of negotiators (i.e., partial coalitions) can generate and implement agreements by themselves, leaving other parties out of the deal (Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1995; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) . For example, partial coalition agreements may not be as lucrative as achieving
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology 30(1) full agreement for the group as a whole (i.e., grand coalition) because they do not use all the available resources. However, they are usually preferable over being left out or reaching an impasse. What makes multiparty coalitions particularly challenging is the fact that for each possible agreement, there usually exist other feasible agreements that may benefit some coalition members. In other words, coalition members need to worry about competing agreements that may be unfavorable to them. As a result, maintaining the stability of a favorable coalition is of paramount importance (Diermeier, Swaab, Medvec, & Kern, 2008) .
Before reaching a final agreement, negotiators communicate with potential coalition partners, along with the group as a whole. Negotiator A might talk to Negotiator B alone to determine if there is potential for a lucrative agreement while also talking to Negotiator B and Negotiator C together. These partial coalition interactions may become stable and lead to final agreements or they may be transitory, being replaced by other partial coalitions or expanded to include additional members (Diermeier et al., 2008) . However, little is known about how coalitions evolve during the negotiation and what negotiators can do to strengthen them through their choice of words. To redress this shortcoming, we focus on how negotiators' language contributes to the formation of stable coalitions.
The theoretical lens of our study is communication accommodation theory (CAT), which posits that conversation partners adapt their speech and communication patterns to become "more like their interactant in a bid to decrease social distance, seek or signal approval, and thereby accommodate" (Giles, Willemyns, Gallois, & Anderson, 2007, p. 142) . The key principles of CAT suggest that people will (a) increasingly accommodate their dialogue partners to develop closer relationships or respond to a volatile situation and (b) signal empathy, a common social identity, or positive face to elicit approval, trust, respect, or cooperation (Giles et al., 2007) . It can be established through a variety of behaviors such as matching word choices, sentence or utterance length, information density, or even mimicking nonverbal cues (Miller, 2005) . People are more likely to converge when they perceive others as more similar, when they desire to be liked or socially accepted, when they want to make a good impression on others, or when they try to minimize the differences in power or social status between themselves and others (Miller, 2005) .
CAT implies that to be included in a deal, negotiators must converge with the linguistic style of their communication partner. Recent research in the field of negotiations supports this idea. For example, mimicking others' nonverbal behavior (Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008) and speech patterns (Curhan & Pentland, 2007) , or matching linguistic styles and word choices (Taylor & Thomas, 2005) , have been found to improve negotiation outcomes overall but especially for the mimicker. Consistent with this research and CAT, we propose that the same mechanism extends to a multiparty negotiation context. Coalition partners who converge semantically by selecting more similar words are more likely to reach agreement compared with those who do not:
Hypothesis 1: The use of similar language is positively correlated to agreement among coalition partners.
Building a positive connection with one's counterpart is not restricted to linguistic mimicry. Earlier work in CAT focused on other linguistic features such as the rate of speech or backchannel communication used to accommodate and attune to other speakers (Jones, Gallois, Callan, & Barker, 1999) . Although we often think of backchannel communication in terms of nonverbal behaviors such as head nods or posture shifts (Duncan, 1972) , they can also be reflected in the words that people use and used to streamline the conversation. For example, assents (e.g., "mmhmm," "yes," "right") let a dialogue partner know that one is in agreement listening and attentive (Johnson, Funk, & Clay-Warner, 1998) . This implies that backchannel cues such as assents can also be conveyed through online conversations and should have similar effects on the negotiators' ability to establish a positive connection. Thus, a second implication of CAT is that backchannel communication should strengthen the relationship between negotiators and decrease the likelihood of being excluded. Recent evidence supports this claim: In a study by Curhan and Pentland (2007) of dyadic negotiations, it was found that assents fostered conversational turn-taking and positively influenced negotiation outcomes. We argue that backchannel cues are equally effective in multiparty negotiations and expect their use by coalition partners (i.e., backchannel or turn-taking cues) to increase the likelihood of reaching agreement:
Hypothesis 2: The use of assents is positively correlated to agreements among coalition partners.
Communication accommodation can also be achieved by expressing emotions. Consistent with Donohue's (1998, p. 75) work which argues that expressions of "warmth, friendliness, intimacy, respect, trust and cooperation" are necessary to establish relationships through the choice of words, we expect that the expression of positive emotional words should increase the likelihood of getting included in a deal. In contrast, negotiators who exhibit anger or other negative emotional words are less likely to obtain a stable agreement (Scissors, Gill, & Gergle, 2008; Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008) . Taken together, these studies suggest that the use of positive emotion words increases the likelihood of an agreement, whereas the use of negative emotion words should negatively affect the likelihood of reaching agreement:
Hypothesis 3: The use of positive emotional language is positively correlated to agreements among coalition partners. Hypothesis 4: The use of negative emotional language is negatively correlated to agreements among coalition partners.
Method

Participants and Procedure
One hundred and eighty MBA students participated in this experimental study. We used an extension of a pure coalition game outlined by Raiffa (1982) . 1 The participants were
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology 30(1) divided into 60 three-person groups. Each participant was assigned one of three roles (A, B, C). Participants were instructed that the aim of the exercise was to interact in an online chat room to negotiate a split of the payoff within the group. Participants were unaware of the real identities of the other negotiation partners. All players were shown the following payoff table in advance of the negotiation (see Table 1 ), which shows that different coalition formations receive different distributions of money. If no coalition is formed, then no player receives a payoff, and players are able to negotiate how the total payoff is distributed when they do. The various payoff options motivate players to form a bond with one other player and then jointly take advantage of the weak bargaining position of the third. This is complicated by the fact that the third player can always make a sufficiently attractive offer to induce one of the members of the partial coalition to defect from the preliminary agreement. For example, C is left in a weaker position if the coalition involves AB or ABC and needs to break up these coalitions to form a new one (AC, BC) to enjoy a better payoff. Moreover, mere concern that the other party may defect can lead a party to abandon the current coalition. Thus, the goals for negotiating parties are to (a) be a member of a coalition and (b) ensure that the coalition is stable. In contrast to bilateral negotiations, the risk is not only an impasse but also being "left out" of the deal (i.e., either receiving nothing or only a pittance; for more details, see Diermeier et al., 2008) .
During the experiment, players were placed at computers in different rooms where they logged into a chat room to begin the negotiating process. Once participants logged into the online system, they always started in a public chat room, but also had three private chat rooms available to interact with other players. For example, Player A could enter a private chat with Player B or Player C. Movement into these private chat rooms was transparent to all players. As players entered or exited a private chat room or the public chat room, a message alerted all players of this fact.
However, the content of these private partial coalition conversations was invisible to the left-out third participant. This feature allowed us to replicate a potentially important feature of face-to-face negotiations in the online environment: If any two parties leave the public meeting space to talk together in private, the content of their communication may be private, but the fact that they decided to talk in private is common knowledge. Importantly, this feature allowed us to operationalize the fact that players have entered into a partial coalition. We could then examine how communication within the partial coalition conversation influenced the outcome of the principal negotiation, especially in terms of whether or not a two-way or three-way deal was formed.
To prepare the data for the automated text analysis, the transcripts of each conversation among different sets of participants in the negotiation were archived and converted into text files from the transcripts. This resulted in four different text files for each group: (a) one for the public conversation of which A, B, and C were all members; (b) one for the conversation between A and B; (c) one for A and C; and (d) one for B and C. These text files (N = 200) represent the sample used in this study.
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC).
To analyze the language used in each of the coalition conversation, we relied on an automated text analysis program called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Pennebaker et al., 2006) .
2 LIWC identifies the linguistic footprints of a text by counting the number of words associated with a series of predefined dictionaries. These include rudimentary linguistic features such as pronoun or verb use, or sociopsychological dimensions such as emotional valence, social processes, or references to friends or family. For any given text, LIWC will calculate the number of words that matches its predefined dictionaries.
For example, if a word such as "hate," which exists in the "negative emotions" dictionary, appeared in a dialogue between two negotiators, it would be scored as a one. If it appeared again, it would receive an additional score of one. If the word "ugly," also in the "negative emotions" dictionary, appeared in the dialogue, it would also receive a score that would now total three (i.e., hate + hate + ugly = 3). At the end of the text analysis, LIWC calculates the total number of times these dictionary words appear in the dialogue divided by the total number of words in the text, creating a percentage. This represents the linguistic footprint or summary of a particular negotiation dialogue. See Table 2 for sample words and the number of words found in the LIWC dictionaries.
Each LIWC dictionary has been compared with a text analysis by human coders to insure reliability and examined for internal validity by using the software on a variety of texts 2 (Pennebaker et al., 2006; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996) . LIWC has demonstrated external validity across a variety of studies, demonstrating how language can (a) represent personality types (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; Pennebaker & Lay, 2002; Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003) , (b) represent how speakers tend to converge on each other's speech styles (Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002) , (c) distinguish deceptive or ironic speech (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 2005) , and (d) represent verbal expressions of emotion (Kahn, Tobin, Massey, & Anderson, 2007) .
Dependent Measure
Coalition agreement. Our dependent measure was a discrete value of whether a dialogue between any set of players within a group reached a final coalition agreement ("1") or
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology 30(1) not ("0"). In other words, for each group, a final coalition agreement could occur between any two participants (i.e., partial coalition: AB, AC, BC) or all three participants (i.e., grand coalition: ABC), whereas the other dialogues in the group would represent a "0." An impasse (no agreement between any participants) occurred in only 9% of the groups.
Independent Measures
Language convergence. We measured language convergence in terms of the amount of information entropy found in a dialogue between the negotiators. Information entropy measures the amount of randomness found in a message and attempts to find the minimum length necessary, or the best possible compression, to communicate that message (Shannon & Weaver, 1963) . Common applications include compression algorithms such as Zipping (e.g., PKZip, GZIP, WinZip), which compress text or media files by finding redundancies among the bits found within each file. These algorithms work by searching through a string of characters, looking for patterns, and replacing any repeated characters or words with a token that they store in their own dictionary. For example, the sentence "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime," could be replaced with "Give 1 2 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 day. Teach 1 2 to 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 lifetime." The more redundancies among words or characters in the text, the higher the amount of compression, and the greater convergence between conversation partners.
Compression algorithms are especially efficient when examining natural language because they contain so many redundancies (Brillouin, 2004) . Scholars have demonstrated how zipping can be used in measuring language similarity between two or more texts (Baronchelli, Caglioti, & Loreto, 2005) and how compression algorithms and entropybased approaches are useful to measure online texts (Gordon, Cao, & Swanson, 2007; Huffaker, Jorgensen, Iacobelli, Tepper, & Cassell, 2006; Nigam, Lafferty, & McCallum, 1999; Schneider, 1996) . In our study, entropy represents the number of similar linguistic choices at both word and phrase levels. Therefore, those with higher levels of entropy are using similar communication and linguistic patterns.
We compressed each dialogue text file using Winzip, a popular zipping application. We then compared the size of the compressed file with the original size (in bytes). This produces a value for the amount of compression that took place or the relative amount of entropy within the document. Because compression algorithms work by finding similar characters or strings, the intuition is that the higher compression or entropy level, the more convergence in the dialogue. An alternative approach for measuring language convergence is to count the number of unique words in the text (also known as a type/token ratio). Niederhoffer and Pennebaker (2002) show the utility of this approach in measuring linguistic style matching in dyadic conversations. We argue that the entropy approach, although similar to linguistic style matching, provides a more rigorous measure of convergence. Compression algorithms include not only similar words but also phrases and, thus, provide a deeper syntactic analysis of the texts generated between two or more people.
Positive emotions. Based on the psycholinguistic dimensions outlined by Pennebaker and King (2001), we measured language that reflects positive affective or emotional processes. We used the "positive feelings" dictionary, which includes 43 words such as "happy" or "nice" (Pennebaker et al., 2006) . This measure represents the number of words that match the LIWC dictionary as a percentage of the total words that the coalition member used during his or her interaction.
Negative emotions. Additionally, we used a contrasting dimension featuring negative affective or emotional processes. We used the "sad emotions" dictionary, which includes 72 words such as "sad" or "hurt" (Pennebaker et al., 2006) . This measure represents the number of words that match the LIWC dictionary as a percentage of the total words that the coalition used during their interaction.
Assents. Based on work by Pennebaker et al. (2003) we measured assents in terms of words such as "yes," "OK," and "mmhmm." We used the "assents" dictionary, which includes 18 words (Pennebaker et al., 2006) . This measure represents the number of words that match the LIWC dictionary as a percentage of the total words that the coalition used during their interaction. Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations for each language dimension, organized by group types (i.e., ABC, AB, AC, BC) and outcome (i.e., reached a final agreement or not). Table 4 presents the correlations between the dependent and independent variables.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
A Multilevel Model of Language and Final Coalition Agreement
In testing our hypotheses, we rely on multilevel modeling (MLM), also referred to as hierarchical linear modeling (Hox, 1995) . MLM is useful because it allows us to examine both the level of interdependence between the individual predictors and the random effects across the 59 different groups. In other words, each dyadic coalition dialogue is embedded in the discourse processes of the entire group-what is said between Player A and Player B could influence what is said between Player B and Player C. MLM allows us to account for the between-group and within-group variances. We use HLM 6.0 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004) , which can analyze data using a binomial distribution, which is appropriate given our binary dependent variable. In preparing the data for analysis, we standardized all predictor variables by subtracting the mean and dividing by two standard deviations. This standardization technique is recommended for MLM when the predictors have different units (see the means and standard deviations in Table 3 ) and allows us to interpret the coefficients on the same scale (Gelman & Hill, 2007) . It is recommended that MLM analysis start with a baseline or null model in which none of the predictors is included. This allows us to examine the independence of both the dyadic-and the group-level units on the outcome variable (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Hox, 1995) . For the former, the intraclass correlation coefficient estimate is used (Hayes, 2006) and calculated as the variance divided by the sum of the variance (τ 2 ) and the estimated residual variance (σ 2 ) of the random effects. For the latter, the chi-square difference test is used. Our intraclass correlation coefficient is .01, suggesting that dyadic observations are fairly independent of each other. Furthermore, as shown in Table 5 , the baseline model (Model 1) demonstrates that no single group had a better than average chance of reaching a coalition agreement, χ 2 (58, N = 200) = 17.31, p > .50. Hypothesis 1 predicted that coalition dialogues that exhibited more language convergence would increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement. We found strong support for Hypothesis 1 that using more language convergence, as measured by the level of entropy within each dialogue, significantly increases agreement (B = 1.40, odds ratio = 4.02, Wald = 3.73, p < .001). Hypothesis 2, which predicted that the use of assents would be positively associated with a final coalition agreement, was supported as well. As shown in Table 5 , Model 2, the overall use of assents is significant (B = 2.69, odds ratio = 14.64, Wald = 3.82, p < .001).
Hypothesis 3 predicted that use of more positive emotional language by coalitions would increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement. However, the data showed that positive emotions were not found to be a significant predictor (p = .68) of reaching a coalition agreement. However, support was found for Hypothesis 4: The expression of negative emotions decreased the likelihood of an agreement (B = −1.73, odds ratio = 0.18, Wald = −2.78, p < .01). Journal of Language and Social Psychology 30(1) 
Additional Analysis of Language Convergence
A potential limitation of our convergence measure is that it is measured at the coalition level, and presents the possibility that an individual who converges on her or his own set of lexical items might give the coalition a higher, but misleading, overall compression score. To address this concern, we conducted a post hoc analysis of the individual dialogues for each member in the coalition. We parsed each text file by individual, compressed the individual files, and compared the mean ratio of these individual texts with the compression ratio of the texts containing all members of the coalition. In support of our previous measure, we found that the average compression difference for successful coalitions (M = 891.91, SD = 581.04, N = 53) is higher than unsuccessful coalitions (M = 326.98, SD = 540.22, N = 147), which constitutes a significant difference, t(198) = −6.40, p < .001. This finding demonstrates that at the individual level too, successful coalition partners are more likely to converge on a shared set of lexical items than their counterparts.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore the linguistic footprints of coalition formation. We found that coalition partners with an agreement display higher levels of language convergence and assent. These findings are consistent with CAT and recent insights on mimicry in negotiations (Curhan & Pentland, 2007; Maddux et al., 2008) . These findings also extend prior research by focusing on the words negotiators use to mimic others in the context of an online multiparty negotiation. In addition, these findings suggest that by mirroring the lexicon of others, negotiators increase their chances of being included in a deal. Although previous work has demonstrated the tendency to converge or mirror the linguistic choices of dialogue partners (Brennan & Clark, 1996) , this study provides suggestive evidence for the potential outcomes of linguistic convergence; namely, that it fosters unity and stability among coalitions. Likewise, our research suggests the potential importance of backchannel communication and turn-taking cues in the absence of nonverbal gestures. Finally, the finding that unsuccessful groups displayed more negative emotions is consistent with previous studies on anger in single-party (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997) and multiparty negotiations (Van Beest et al., 2008) , as well as more and recent work showing that reciprocating negative emotions is more likely to occur in lowtrusting dyadic pairs in social dilemmas (Scissors, Gill, Geraghty, & Gergle, 2009 ). Contrary to expectations, we did not find that positive emotions increased agreement. One possible reason for this finding is that the text-based emotions expressed in the online chats might not have been as pervasive as nonverbal and verbal emotional expressions that occur face to face. It could be that the strategies used to establish a positive connection commonly associated with CAT (Giles et al., 2007) are better expressed through assents or linguistic convergence rather than through words that explicitly state positive emotions. Together, our findings provide support for CAT in the context of online multiparty negotiations and also extend the theory by showing that a sense of unity can be established more effectively through linguistic convergence and backchannel communication.
The linguistic behavior we observed may not necessarily have been the result of conscious deliberation. Some negotiators may exhibit the behaviors we observed without intending to do so. However, this does not mean that these behaviors were less powerful. In fact, the behavioral mimicry literature showed that matching facial expressions, postures, affective responses, and other mannerisms has a strong impact on mutual liking and trust but is usually done unconsciously, with people typically being unaware of mimicking or being mimicked (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) . Despite the fact that we did not instruct negotiators to deliberately express assent or linguistic convergence, it can be expected that such instructions produce similar, if not stronger effects. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that mimicry can be used strategically (Maddux et al., 2008; Van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & Van Knippenberg, 2003) . We propose that actively mimicking words in an online environment should improve or enhance the negotiation outcomes. Future research should investigate the impact of linguistic convergence in online negotiations in more detail.
The current research contributes to the literature on coalition formation and negotiation by showing how language is related to coalition formation in multiparty negotiations. Whereas previous research has not addressed the impact of rhetorical strategies in multiparty negotiations, the present findings provide an empirical basis for understanding what type of language affects the formation of a stable coalition. This has practical implications for negotiators who, by actively converging on a similar set of lexical choices,
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Journal of Language and Social Psychology 30(1) metaphors, or other linguistic tokens as their partners, can create a sense of unity and thereby increase their inclusion into an agreement.
Our results demonstrate that linguistic convergence and the use of assent words can be powerful tools to secure inclusion in online multiparty negotiations. The likelihood of exclusion is often higher online than in face-to-face, audio, or video negotiation because it is harder to establish a positive social connection with the counterpart. Our results suggest that converging on a counterpart's language as well as expressing assent can be a powerful way to build the social capital necessary to facilitate the negotiation process.
